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PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE FOR THE
UNION ORGANIZER
IN EVERY campaign for union membership, a principal factor is the
union organizer. Although employees occasionally play an important
role in union recruitment, the organizer is usually a professional with-
out whose efforts many workers would never be persuaded to join the
labor movement." As an individual citizen the organizer is entitled to
the full benefit of state and national laws, with all the rights, privileges
and immunities they provide. However, these laws serve merely as a
foundation of equality upon which there has been constructed an ad-
ditional network of legal safeguards for the organizer in his work.
Under the original National Labor Relations Act,2 which embodied a
federal policy of encouraging unionism and collective bargaining, the
organizer acquired derivatively a group of protective rights previously
unknown in American law.3 Because his work contributed much to the
furtherance of federal policy, the protection afforded his activities was
accordingly extensive. The 1947 amendments4 to the Act represent a
partial retreat from the previous governmental design to the extent that
the present objective is to provide the individual laborer with as much
freedom of choice as, possible on the issue of unionization. Although
this policy change, as manifested in the Labor Management Relations
Act," has been in effect slightly more than ten years, it should prove
productive to outline the sources and extent of the legal protection and
Seidman, London, & Karsb, Why Workers Join Unions, 274 Annals 75 (195).
549 STAT. 449 (1935).
'Both professional and non-professional union organizers benefited by § 8(i) of
the National Labor Relations Act, which made unlawful as "unfair labor practices"
conduct by employers and others acting in their behalf which interfered with the
exercise by employees of rights guaranteed to them by § 7 of that Act. 49 STAT. 449,
452 ('935)-
'Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 STAT. 136 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
'See Taft, The Taft-Hartley 4ct: A Favorable View, 274 Annals 195 0950;
Taylor, National Labor Folicy, 274 Annals x85 (3195).
An exception to this full freedom of choice is made where a "modified union shop"
agreement is negotiated under the conditions imposed by § 8(a) (3) Labor Management
Relations Act, which, in themselves, allow some freedom of choice. 49 STAT. 449 452
('935), as amended, 61 STAT. 136, 140 (1947), 29 U.s.C. § ix8(a)( 3 ).
0 49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
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assistance now available to the union organizer and to attempt an
appraisal of the recent decisions in this area.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
In Thomas v. ColUns7 the United States Supreme Court ruled that a
state law requiring registration by a union organizer as a prerequisite to
the making of an address on the general merits of unionism, including
as well a general appeal for union membership, to a group of assembled
employees was an unconstitutional burden on the freedom of speech as
protected by the first amendment. The activities of a union organizer
usually are not limited to pure free speech, however, and thus are not
fully protected by the constitutional umbrella." Direct personal solicita-
tions seeking union membership, as distinguished from general public
appeals, so much resemble ordinary business dealings that these functions
are subject to regulation in the form of reasonable registration require-
ments Nevertheless, when the regulation imposes serious practical
burdens on the union organizer's operations, the obligation will be
invalid. Unreasonable regulation has been found in inadequately con-
trolled discretion vested in a licensing official," and very probably the
charging of a fee larger than necessary to cover minor clerical expenses
would also be fatal to an attempt at this type of regulation.:"
7 323 U.S. 516 (x945). The Texas statute involved in this case did not vest
discretion in the issuing officer, but required automatic issuance of the necessary permit
upon proper filing of an application.
" In. the law of labor relations, the idea that some activities may be partly pro-
tected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech, but not fully protected when that
same activity takes on different or additional characteristics is most familiar in the area of
picketing. See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941);- Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
'In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 5x6 (1945), the Court indicated in a dictum that
when ". . . the speaker goes further . . . and engages in conduct which amounts to
more than the right of free discussion comprehends, . . . he enters a realm where a
reasonable registraton or identification requirement may be imposed." Id. at 540.
In A.F.L. v.-Mann, x88 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), the registration re-
quirement involved in the Thomas case, supra note 9, was held valid as applied to labor
organizers' solicitations made "otherwise than as part of a public speech to assembled
employees." Id. at 279.
"o Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (.9+5).
"'Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Denton v. City of Carrollton,
235 F.2d 481 (sth Cir. x956). The statutes in these cases involved prohibitive fees,
but the cases were decided on other grounds. There is little doubt, however, that such
a fee would, without more, invalidate the licensing law. See Note, 70 HARY. L. REv.
.1271 276 (1957).
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ToRTs AND CRIMES AS UNFAIR PRACTICES
Paradoxically, the Labor Management Relations Act, which is a
major source of protection for a union organizer, nowhere guarantees
or even states the rights of organizers as such. Section 712 of the Act,
which establishes the freedom of employees either to engage in union
activity or to refrain from it, makes no mention of the rights of the
non-employee professional union organizer.' 3 Consequently, any rights
to which a union organizer is entitled by virtue of the Act must be
found by negative implication from the restrictions which administrative
and judicial bodies have placed upon the conduct of employers and
others which tends to interfere with the exercise by employees of their
specifically granted rights. The right of employees "to self-organiza-
tion, to form, join, or assist labor organizations" granted by section 7
of the Act, and protected from interference, restraint and coercion by
employers in section 8(a)(i) of the Act, 4 implicitly includes full free-
dom to receive aid, advice, and information from others concerning these
rights, their practice, and enjoyment. 5 The courts have recognized that
' "Section 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requring membership in a labor organization as a condition of em-
ployment as authorized in section sg8(a)(3) of this title." Labor Management
Relations Act § 7, 49 STAT. 149, 452 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 136, 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
"
3 As one court has stated, "the National Labor Relations Act was passed for the
primary benefit of employees as distinguished from the primary benefit to labor unions
and . ..was intended by Congress as a grant of rights to the employees rather than
as a grant of power to the union." NLRB v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773, 774 (sth Cir.
1945).
2' "Section 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(x) to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157 of this title." Labor Management Relations Act § 8(a)(s), 49 STAT.
449, 452 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 136, 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 1S8(a)(1)
(1952).
"'The National Labor Relations Board so ruled in Weyerheauser Timber Co.o 31
N.L.R.B. 258 (1941). Furthermore, authorities in the field of labor relations and
economics agree that in our complex industrial society, employees must have outside
help in order effectively to participate in the processes of self-organization and col-
lective bargaining. See, e.g., DAUGHERTY, LABOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY
421-22, 444-50 (Sth ed. 1941); testimony of Paul H. Douglas, Hearings on S.
2926 Before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess.,
pt. i, at 2oS (1934). This seems to have been the intent of Congress at the time
of passage of the original Act. 79 CoNG. REc., 7668-7681; H.R. REP. No. 1147, 7 4th
Cong., ist Sess. 15-20 (1935).
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the rights of non-employee organizers under the Act derive solely from
the section 7 rights of employees, and exist only to the extent that the
activities (might they be called, in this connection, "services"?) of these
outside organizers are reasonably necessary to effectuate those employee
rights.
Obviously a union organizer, as an individual, is entitled to the full
protection of the civil and criminal law of the locality in which he
operates. More important to the setting of labor relations, however,
criminal and tortious conduct directed at the union organizer is likely
to have an intimadatory effect tending to cause a breakdown of organizer-
employee contact, thereby resulting in interference with the organiza-
tional rights of employees. Thus viewed, such conduct, if attributable
to an employer, becomes an unfair labor practice7 subject to remedy
through orders issued by the National Labor Relations Board and en-
forced by the courts. Remedial orders designed to correct such a situa-
tion may require an employer (i) to cease and desist from conduct found
to interfere with employees' rights; (2) to notify his employees that he
will not permit such conduct in the future; (3) to instruct, in writing, any
employees or agents who have committed acts of force or violence or
intimidation to cease such activities.' Although not so drastic, in the
sense of punishment, as a criminal sanction would be, and although not
NLRB v. United Steelworkers, CIO, 357 U.S. 357 (1958); NLRB v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); NLRB v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 225 F.zd
z6 (pth Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 923 (1956) 5 NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber
Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948).
" Examples of criminal and tortious conduct for which employers have been held
responsible under the Act include beating up an organizer after decoying him from
town, Brown Shoe Co., i N.L.R.B. 803 (-936) i running organizers off the sidewalk
outside the gates of the employer's plant where they were distributing literature, Mock-
Judson-Voehringer Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 133 (1938); shooting at an organizer's house,
Tennessee Products Co., ti N.L.R.B. 326 (1942), enforced," 34 F.zd 486 (6th Cir.
1943) ; throwing a bomb into an organizer's home, Clover Fork Coal Co., 4 N.L.R.B.
202 (x937), enforced, 97 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1938). Less violent but equally illegal
reprisals against union organizers have included a supervisors following of two union
organizers back to town after they had distributed literature to the workers at the
plant entrance, E-Z Mills, Inc., iox N.L.R.B. 979 (195z); an employer's obtaining,
in bad faith, an injunction against union organizational activities in a company town,
W. T. Carter, 90 N.L.R.B. 2020 (1950) ; procuring, in bad faith, the arrest of a union
organizer, Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 8o2 (1937); the reporting of a
union leader to the immigration authorities in an attempt to secure his deportation,
for the purpose of discouraging union activity, Ford Motor Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 732
(0940).
"
8Ford Motor Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 322 (1940), enforced, ri9 F.2d 326 (5th Cir.
1941).
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involving the payment of damages as in the case of a tort action, it
would appear that, upon enforcement, the affirmative portions of the
typical Board order would not only nullify whatever anti-union effect
the employer had hoped to accomplish by his illegal activities, but could
sometimes operate as a positive aid to the organizer's campaign. 19
In communities where an anti-union sentiment prevails, a labor
organizer frequently becomes a special target for abuse. For this
reason it is worthwhile to note that an employer can, in certain circum-
stances, be held responsible under the Act for the conduct of persons
outside his plant or business if they are found to be acting as his agents. 20
If an employer, through economic domination of a community, exercises
control over local officials such as the mayor and the police, he may be
held responsible for their anti-union conduct. 21  Economic influence
alone, however, will not make an employer responsible for all the anti-
19 In order to effectuate the fundamental policies of the Act, the orders issued by
the Board when an unfair labor practice is found will be broad enough to remedy the
entire pattern of illegal conduct, Cleff and Spear, io4. N.L.R.B. 1048 (953); West
Bros., 104 N.L.R.B. 332 (953) i W. T. Grant Co., xo4 N.L.R.B. 338 (1953), and, if a
court decree enforcing the order is secured, will place an employer in the position of
having to conduct his labor relations under the constant peril of a summons for contempt
should he again be found to have committed an unfair labor practice within the terms
of the court's order. A great amount of freedom is allowed the Board in framing its
orders where the attitude of the employer indicates that he is militantly opposed to
union activities among his employees or that he is determined to find a way to evade
the order. May Department Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945); American
Enka Corp. v. NLRB, 119 F.zd 60 (4th Cir. 194i). However, the power of
the Board to issue cease and desist orders is no greater than that of a court
empowered to issue injunctions in any other litigation. NLRB v. Express Publishing
Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941). The test for the proper scope of such an order
is whether the Board might have reasonably concluded from the evidence that
such an order was necessary to prevent the employer from engaging in any unfair labor
practices affecting commerce. NLRB v. Cheney California Lumber Co., 327 U.S.
385 (.946).
20 The original Act included in the definition of "employer," "any person acting in
the interest of an employer." 49 STAT. 449, 450 (2935). Under this language, em-
ployers were frequently held responsible for the conduct of others which they did not
authorize and had tried to prevent. American Steel Scraper Co., z9 N.L.R.B. 939
(194); Schult Trailers, Inc., z8 N.L.R.B. 975 (1941i Frost Rubber Works, 23
N.L.R.B. 1071 (1940). The amended Act, by defining the scope of employer re-
sponsibility in terms of agency, makes employers responsible for what people do or say
only when it is within the actual or apparent scope of their authority. 49 STAT. 449,
450 (1935), as amended, 6x STAT. 136, 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1952); H.R.
REP. No. 245, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. ix (1947); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 51o, Both
Cong., ist Sess., 31-32 (947).
"1 Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 8o N.L.R.B. 478, 486, 503 (948), enforced, 179 F.2d
589 (sth Cir. 195o ) ; NLRB v. American Furnace Co., x58 F.zd 376 (7 th Cir. 1946).
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union activities in his locality. Where the connection between the em-
ployer and the person who actually causes the interference, restraint,
or coercion is normally very remote, a rebuttable presumption of no
agency relationship prevails, requiring dear proof of direction or con-
trol in order to fix the employer with responsibility.2
Even where there is no actual employer supervision or sponsorship
of the anti-union behavior, an unfair labor practice may be found if
there can be made out a ratification of, or acquiscence in, the acts in
question.23  Consequently, when anti-union conduct has occurred under
circumstances tending to indicate employer endorsement, affirmative
disavowals of responsibility and declarations of continued neutrality may
be necessary to avoid an unfair labor practice charge.24  The net effect
of such an exchange could conceivably result in benefit to the organizer's
purpose. Thus, the rules of imputed employer liability are an important
source of protection for the labor organizer since they block an obvious
avenue of evading responsibility for unfair practices and shield the
organizer's activities from much interference which would not other-
wise be illegal under the Act.
THE RIGHT To USE COMPANY PROPERTY
The largest body of law concerning the legal status of the union
organizer has evolved from attempts to use the time and property of
employers for union organizational purposes. The convenient daily
assemblage of employees in a setting traditionally devoted to business
matters makes the plant premises, from the organizer's viewpoint, the
ideal place to contact employees. 5  Employers, naturally enough, are
likely to have a contrary viewpoint. In as much as organizational
"Where a local banker was known by the employees to be a member of the
company's board of directors, the employer was held responsible for his anti-union
conduct in effecting a strike settlement, Eastman Cotton Mills, 90 N.L.R.B. 31 (1950).
In the special circumstances of another case, an employer was held responsible for anti-
union speeches made by prominent citizens which the employer failed to repudiate,
Colonial Shirt Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. 711 (1951). But before the Board will find an
employer responsible for the anti-union acts of municipal and police officials; there
must be clear and convincing proof to overcome the presumption that such officials are
acting in the public interest. NLRB v. Bibb Mfg. Co., 188 F.zd 825 (5 th Cir. 1951).
23 See 16 NLRB ANN. REP. 157 (1951)
"Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp, 8z N.L.R.B. 16x (1949).
"Other psychological factors might also aid the organizer who is able to contact
employees at the plant, e.g., unenthusiastic employees probably would listen more
readily to the organizer's ' pitch"l on company time, and group pressures could be
more easily employed to induce reluctant workers to accept the union. See, Seidman,
London, & Karsh, Why Workers Join Unions, 274 Annals 75 (1951).
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activities often involve heated discussions and sometimes violence, it is
understandable that, even though he is not intrinsically opposed to the
unionization of his workers, an employer might want to prohibit all
union activity at his plant in order to avoid interference with efficient
production. Relying on the right of exclusive use and control inherent
in the ownership of property, many employers refuse voluntarily to
allow the use of company premises for- organizational purposes. An
employer's right to prohibit such activity on his property is subject to
severe limitations, however. The national policy supporting the right
of employees to self-organization has in some cases taken precedence
over historic property rights where these two conflicting legitimate in-
terests cannot be reconciled.28 By contrast, neither the interest of the
employer in maintaining production, which is the raison d'etre of the
employment relationship, nor his closely related interests in orderly
conduct and cleanliness at his plant has been subordinated to the em-
ployees' interest in self-organization. 7  In the process of adjusting
these basic competing interests, the right of a non-employee union
organizer to have access to company property has emerged?8
Although an employee engaged in organizational activities20 on com-
pany property has considerably more freedom of protected action than
does an outsider, 0 an employer will not be found to have placed an
undue restriction on employees' rights of self-organization if he prohibits
"Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.s. 793 (1945); NLRB v. Lake Superior
Lumber Corp., x67 F.zd 147 (6th Cir. 1948). In a case not actually requiring
subordination of property rights, the Supreme Court said, "Organization rights are
granted to workers by the same authority, the National Government, that preserves
property rights. Accommodation between the two must be obtained with as little
destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other." NLRB v. Babcock
& Wilcox, Co., 351 U.S. 1o, 112 (1956). While this case arose in a setting of unfair
labor practices under the Labor Management Relations Act, and ostensibly does not rest
upon a constitutional basis, the discussion actually goes to that depth and deals with
the fundamental adjustment of rights of speech and rights of private property.
"During working time, the common-law rights of the employer are superior to
the statutory rights of the employees. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 26.
"Prior to NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, Co., 351 U.S. 105 (x956), there had been
no clear distinction between the rights of employees and non-employees in this regard.
The most recent Supreme Court decision in this general area, NLRB v. United Steel-
workers, CIO, 357 U.S. 357 (1958), dicussed infra, notes 35, 36, 4l,.48, 5i-53, deals
with discrimination against employees, but language used by the Court appears to lay
down rules of general application to non-employees as well.
" These may include such activities as distributing union literature, Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); wearing union buttons and insignia,
Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 2x7 F.2d 369 ( 9 th Cir. 1954); soliciting membership,
NLRB v. Denver Tent & Awning Co., 138 F.2d 4to (oth Cir. 1943).
'0NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, Co., 351 U.S. 1o5 (.956).
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all organizational activity during working hours, a term which does not
encompass rest periods, lunch periods, or any other time allotted to the
employees' own use.31 Moreover, where there are special circumstances
related to a legitimate business interest of the employer which would
make solicitation of union membership among employees particularly
undesirable, prohibition of solicitation on the premises during non-work-
ing hours as well will be lawfulY2 In general, the Supreme Court has
given its approval to the Board's statement of the general rules under
which an employer is allowed to restrict union activity among his
employees 3
The Right To Exclude Non-employee Organizers
The Supreme Court first made a distinction between the rights of
employee and non-employee organizers to have access to company
property in the leading case of NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. 4
There it was held that an employer could exclude non-employee organ-
izers attempting to distribute union literature in the company parking
NLRB v. May Dept. Stores, Co., 154 F.zd 533 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 725 (1946) 5 NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 229 F.zd 816 (5th Cir. 1956) i
Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., Test Fleet Branch, 19 N.L.R.B. No. 52 (1957).
" NLRB v. Aintree Corp., 135 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1943), where, in a situation of
intense rivalry between two employee factions, distribution of inflamatory literature
prior to working hours was forbidden; Maryland Drydock Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.zd
538 ( 4 th Cir. 195o), where the literature forbidden to be distributed contained
defamatory matter directed at the company president and others5 NLRB v. Kentucky
Utilities Co., 191 F.2 d 858 (6th Cir. i95i), where solicitation was prohibited at all
times near dangerous machinery; Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, zoo F.2d 375 ( 7 th
Cir. x952), where a retail department store employer prohibited union activity at all
times in the selling areas where employees were in contact with customers. Cf. NLRB v.
May Dept. Stores, Co., sopra note 31, where a similar blanket prohibition was held
invalid insofar as it applied to non-selling areas in the store.
"' "The Act, of course, does not prevent an employer from making and enforcing
reasonable rules covering the conduct of employees on company time. Working time
is for work. It is therefore within the province of an employer to promulgate and
enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation during working hours. Such a rule must
be presumed valid in the absence of evidence that it was adopted for a discriminatory
purpose. It is no less true that time outside working hours, whether before or after
work, or during luncheon or rest periods, is an employee's time to use as he wishes
without unreasonable restraint, although the employee is on company property. It is
therefore not within the province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule
prohibiting union solicitation by an employee outside of working hours, although
on company property. Such a rule must be presumed to be an unreasonable impediment
to self-organization and therefore discriminatory in the absence of evidence that special
circumstances make the rule necessary in order to maintain production or discipline."
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803, n. 1o (945), quoting from
Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 8z8, 843-44 (1943).
84351 U.S. 105 (1956).
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lot since reasonable efforts by the union through other available channels
of communication would enable it to reach the employees with its
message. 5 Whether a particular case involves that degree of inacces-
sibility which is required before it becomes unlawful to exclude outside
organizers will always require an ad hoc evaluation.80 However, the
cases which have come before the courts present a fair cross section for
analysis. An isolated lumber camp where employees live as well as
work on company property would present the clearest case for imposing
an obligation on the employer to allow non-employee organizers to come
onto his premises in order to contact the employees. Furthermore, the
fact that workers in these isolated areas may have relatively frequent
time-off periods away from camp (two days each week, in one case) does
not relieve the employer of the duty to let the organizer in.8 7  In less
extreme cases of inaccessibility, the factors of concentration and density
of employees in the nearby residential areas become important. In the
Babcock & Wilcox Co. case the plant was about one mile from a town
of 21,000 where forty per cent of the 500 workers lived, the remaining
sixty per cent living within a radius of thirty miles."' The Court men-
tioned, but gave no weight to the fact, that heavy traffic on the im-
mediately adjacent highway made it unsafe to utilize the only small
strip of public property near the plant entrance for distributing the
"Although the rights of employees and non-employees in this regard are not
identical, the established criterion for testing (i) the basic validity of a rule restricting
organizational activity by either group, and (z) fairness in the application to either
group of an "otherwise valid" rule is the same: the practical difficulty of reaching
employees with a pro-union message by means not requiring use of the employer's
premises. NLRB v. United Steelworkers, CIO, 357 U.S. 357 (1958), dealing with
employee organizersi NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), dealing
with non-employee organizers.
"8 Failure to introduce evidence on the subject of relative difficulty of using other
channels of communication was deemed a fatal defect in the companion cases, NLRB v.
United Steelworkers, CIO, and NLRB v. Avondale Mills, 357 U.S. 357 (x958).
"'Lake Superior Lumber Corp. v. NLRB, x67 F.ad 147 (6th Cir. 1948)3 Weyer-
heauser Timber Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 258 (1941).
The crew of a ship would be in a comparable situation-isolated most of the time,
but with occasional free time ashore. In a case of this type the court required
operators of ocean-going vessels to allow union representatives to come aboard for the
limited purpose of ascertaining whether the union members of the crew had any
grievances, but the court made a specific reservation that the employer not be required
to issue the passes for organizational activities because no showing was made that
organizational activities could not be carried on just as well ashore. NLRB v. Cities
Service Oil Co., iza F.ad 149 (2d Cir. 5941).
" In NLRB v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 225 F.2d x6 (9 th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 923 (1956), a case in which a similar result was reached, the conditions were
even more favorable. 67% of the employees lived in a town about a mile from the
plant and 85% lived in a radius of x2 miles.
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literature3 9 The Court noted, instead, the employees could be con-
tacted personally on the streets of the nearby town, by telephone, by
letter, and at advertised meetings.4" Obviously, the peculiar circum-
stances of each case will need to be evaluated in terms of practical con-
venience for contact.41
There may be times when, for the purposes of having access to
company property, an organizer's status as an employee or non-employee
is in doubt. The Board has ruled that an employee retains his status
as such even though he is on extended leave of absence. 42 Without
reaching this issue, however, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit denied the Board's petition for enforcement of its order, holding
that, in any event the employee involved had forfeited his protected
status by entering the premises accompanied by two non-employee union
representatives.4 3 Instead of the employee raising the non-employee
organizer to the former's protected status, the result is just the reverse.
Thus, although not directly concerned with the point, the case may have
" A convenient public place to contact the employees in the vicinity of the place
of employment was a determining factor in upholding the validity of a no-solicitation
rule in a retail store in a metropolitan area. There were five entrances to the store
used exclusively by 95% of the employees at periods when these entrances were not used
by the public generally. Because of the ease with which employees might be contacted
-near these entrances for organizational purposes, the court allowed the employer to
prohibit union activity on the premises at all times. Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB,
2oo F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952). Accord, where literature could easily be distributed
at plant gate, Newport News Children's Dress Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1521 (1950). An
employer will be guilty of an unfair labor practice if he interferes with an organizer
on public property outside the plant gate, H.&H. Mfg. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1373 (s949) ;
but not if he calls police who merely instruct the organizer not to block the plant
gates, E.A. Laboratories, Inc. 88 N.L.R.B. 673 (1950).
"o No mention was made of an employer's obligation to furnish the union with
names, phone numbers, and addresses of employees. If required, this might be a
heavy price to pay for being allowed to deny access. If not required, some of the
Court's suggestions for easy contact become rather questionable.
"
1 A recent dictum of the Supreme Court might serve as a guide in this respect:
"If, by virtue of the location of the plant and of the facilities and resources available
to the union, the opportunities for effectively reaching the employees with a pro-union
message, in spite of a no-solicitation rule, are at least as great as the employer's ability
to promote the legally authorized expression of his anti-union views, there is no
basis for invalidating these 'otherwise valid' rules.' NLRB v. United Steelworkers,
CIO, 357 U.S. 357, 364. ( 1958).
'Cranston Print Works, i17 N.L.R.B. 1834 (1957). The Board rejected the
employer's contention that, since the employee in question was not on company property
in connection with his employment, he should have no greater rights of access than a
non-employee organizer, and rested its decision upon the "mutuality of employment
interests of all employees of a single employer" irrespective of their then current
working status. Id. at 1842.
" NLRB v. Cranston Print Works, CCH Lab. Cas. 71,746 (4 th Cir. 1958).
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the further significance of foreclosing any future argument that the non-
employee organizer may acquire, through principles of agency or other-
wise, the more extensive rights of the employee.
Forfeiture of the Right To Exclude Organizers and To Restrict
Organizational Activity on the Premises
Even where circumstances are such that an employer could lawfully
prohibit union membership solicitation during non-working hours, 44 the
privilege of a "no-solicitation" rule may be lost if the employer dis-
criminates against the union by allowing, during those same hours,
identical activities in behalf of some non-union cause4 5 or if the em-
ployer uses means.of communication denied to the union for his own anti-
union purposes.46 This rule cannot, however, be turned into a general
mandate requiring employers to insure the union equal opportunity for
contact with employees as a prerequisite to allowing civic groups tQ
contact their employees, or as a condition to the lawful exercise of the
employers' privilege of expressing non-coercive anti-union views41
through normally available channels. 8  It is dear that enforcement of
a rule restricting union organizational activity, together with non-enforce-
ment or non-observance of the same rule by the employer in the case of
non-union organizations does not, without more, amount to an unfair
"" Non-employees may be so restricted at all times in the absence of a showing of
unusual hardship, NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); employees
may be so restricted if the rule is necessary to protect a legitimate business interest of
the employer, Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB 2oo F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952).
"An employer was found guilty of an unfair labor practice when he refused a-
request by a union organizer who sought permission to hold a meeting in the only
available hall which was company-owned and to which several civic organizations were
permitted access. NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949). Cf. Richfield
Oil Co. v. NLRB, 143 F.2d 86o ( 9th Cir. '944), where exceptions made to security-
regulations were considered, in the circumstances, illegally discriminatory.
"6An unfair labor practice was found in the combination of (i) a no-solicitatioir
rule which excluded union organizers from the premises at all times, (2) a non-coercive
anti-union speech by the employer to employees on company time, and (3) denial of a
request by the union for an opportunity to make a reply speech under equivalent
circumstances. Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 195z). Cf.
NLRB v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 214 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954), where similar conduct
was considered to be protected under the § 8(c) guarantee of the employer's right to
free expression on non-coercive anti-union views.
""Section 8 .... (c) The expression of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any provision of this
subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit." 49 STAT. 449, 452 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 136, 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C.§ 58(c) (952).
"[The Taft-Hartley Act does not command that labor organizations as a matter
IVoL1 959: 78
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labor practice. 9 An employer, because of his duty to refrain from giving
aid to any union,50 is not obligated to take the initiative by of-
fering the use of his facilities and the time of his employees for pro-
union solicitation." Consequently, a union organizer seeking, on the
basis of discrimination, to avoid an otherwise valid no-solicitation or no-
distribution rule must, as a prerequisite to the finding of an unfair labor
practice, request the employer to suspend such rules and permit the
particular type of communication desired. 2 Furthermore, in order
to establish that a rule restricting organizational activity is unlawful as
written or, though apparently valid,53 has been unfairly applied, there
must be a showing that the restriction, as viewed "in the actualities of
industrial relations," has substantially impaired the union's ability to
reach employees with its message. 4
If existing rules have already been suspended in favor of one union,
the employer will be guilty of an unfair labor practice if he enforces the
of abstract law, under all circumstances, be protected in the use of every possible means
of reaching the minds of individual workers, nor that they are entitled to use a medium
of communication simply because the employer is using it." NLRB v. United Steel-
workers, CIO, 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958), citing with approval Bonwit Teller, Inc. v.
NLRB, 197 F.2d 640, 646 (2d Cir. 1952) and NLRB v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 214
F.zd 78, 84 (6th Cir. 1954) (concurring opinion).
' NLRB v. United Steelworkers, CIO, 357 U.S. 357 (.958).
50 "Section 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . (2) to
dominate or interfere with the formation .. .of any labor organization or contribute
financial or other support of it. . . P" 49 STAT. 44-9, 452 (1935), as amended, 61
STAT. 136, 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1952).
a NLRB v. United Steelworkers, CIO, 357 U.S. 357, 363 (-958).
'" In the face of obviously anti-union sentiment and a context of unfair labor
practices, the Court refused to conclude, as a matter of law, that such a request would
have been futile, but did indicate that the Board, utilizing its administrative expertise,
might properly so find as a matter of industrial experience, possibly thus obviating the
need for a request in some situations. NLRB v. United Steelworkers, CIO, 357 U.S.
357, 363 (1958). Such a request was made in each of the following cases where unfair
labor practices were found on the basis of discrimination: NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co.,
336 U.S. 226 (x949); Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 195z) 5
Richfield Oil Co. v. NLRB, 143 F.zd 86o ( 9 th Cir. I944). Also, ejection of a
representative from the premises was not an unfair labor practice where he had not
requested permission to enter the premises and thus was an apparent trespasser, Mc-
Kinney Lumber Co., 8z N.L.R.B. 38 (949).
"' The no-solicitation and no-distribution rules involved in NLRB v. United Steel-
workers, CIO, supra note 52, appear to be unlawful per se under the rules enunciated
in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLR.B, 324 U.S. 793 (945), but it was made clear
that in as much as the basic validity of the rules was not challenged, they would be
treated as valid for the purpose of considering the narrow question of illegal discrimina-
tion in application.
"' It is presumed that the same factors relating to availability of alternate channels
of communication which were considered relevant in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
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rules against a rival union.55 Equally illegal is the extension of special
favors to representatives of one union or employee group while denying
them to a rival faction."8 Also, a rule broadly prohibiting solicitation and
distribution on company premises and carefully enforced without dis-
crimination may be found to be unlawful as applied against union repre-
sentatives merely because it was not adopted until the organization
campaign began.57
An employer's right to exclude non-employee organizers is ap-
parently limited to the non-public areas of his plant or business, for
attempts to deny union organizers 8 and others"9 access to semi-public
property" which the employer owns have proved unsuccessful."' Thus,
union organizers probably cannot lawfully be excluded from the parking
351 U.S. 105 (1956), and NLRB v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 225 F.2d 16 (9 th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 923 (1956), would be determinative of the issue of
substantial impairment through the discriminatory application of no-solicitation rules
as well. Enforcement of the rule in question was tantamount to foreclosure of all
other contact in Richfield Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 143 F.2d 86o (gth Cir. 1944), where
the employees were aboard a ship. Substantial impairment clearly resulted in NLRB v.
Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. -zz6 (949), as the meeting hall sought was the only
one in town. In Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.zd 640 (2d Cir. 1952), where
some 900 employees lived in the greater New York City area, the court agreed with
the Board that, in the circumstances, ". . . the practical advantage to the employer
who was opposed to unionization would constitute a serious interference with the
right of employees to organize." Id. at 645.
"Sam'l Bingham's Son Mfg. Co., So N.L.R.B. 16iz (1948), where the employer
enforced rules against solicitation during work time against representatives of C.I.O.
while allowing a representative of A.F. of L. to make a speech during working time.
But no unfair labor practice was found in the mere suspension of rules in favor of
one union where there was no indication that the rules would be enforced against the
complaining union. Pure Oil Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 539 (-947).
"'Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 112 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1940),
aff d per curiam, 3 1Z U.S. 66o (1940), where discrimination in the use of a company
recreation room for electioneering purposes was in favor of a company dominated
union. NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (-940), where the
employer favored one of two outside unions by discrimination in granting ship's passes.
" Such a rule was found to show a discriminatory motive in American Book-Strat-
ford Press, Inc., so NLRB 914 (1948). A Board finding that a no-distribution and
no-solicitation rule was adopted merely for the purpose of impeding employees' organi-
zational activities, and was, thus, unlawfully discriminatory, was recently affrmed in
NLRB v. Commercial Controls Corp., 34 CCH Lab. Cas. 74,477 (2d Cir. 1958).
" Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 2oo F.2d 375 (7 th Cir. 1952), decided under
the Labor Management Relations Act.
" Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 5o (x946), involving Jehovah's Witnesses, decided
on constitutional grounds.
60 A company-owned alley-way between two portions of the building located in a
metropolitan area, Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 2oo F.2d 375 (7 th Cir. 195z)
a street in a town totally owned by the company, Marsh v. Alabama, supra note 59.
"' See cases cited in notes 58 and 59, supra.
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lots of suburban shopping centers, 62 a location likely to be utilized more
frequently in the future by organizers in light of modern retail trends.
Once it is determined that an organizer must be given access to
company property, he nevertheless is expected to observe safety require-
ments and other rules applicable to business visitors generally.63 The
organizer may be required, for instance, to register upon entry on the
premises,64 may be denied access to certain areas of the employer's
property where business considerations are shown to justify such a
limitation, 5 and may have his pass revoked if the limitations are not
observed. 8
WHAT ORGANIZERS A.E PROTECTED
Although the Act nowhere defines "organizer" as it does "em-
ployee" and "employer," the sources of the rights granted therein give
some indication of the persons who may enjoy them. While the con-
stitutional rights of free speech and assembly obviously have unlimited
availability and uniform restrictions0 7 the organizer's "special rights,"
emanating from those of employees under the Act, would seem to ex-
tend to anyone whose activities facilitated the employees' full exercise
of their section 7 rights 8 without contravening the basic policy of the
Act. A fundamental element of that policy is the free choice by em-
ployees of their representatives. Therefore, it would seem that an
employer with the knowledge or belief that an organizer was at-
tempting to defraud his employees might be precluded from sub-
stituting his judgment for that of his workers regarding the
2A case arising in intra-state commerce and decided under § 923 of the California
Labor Code (which, the court stated, does not differ materially from corresponding
sections of the Labor Management Relations Act) involved an employer who was,
as to the parking lot and sidewalks around the shopping center, a tenant in common
with owners of other business establishments located there, but who did not have such
'exclusive control of these areas that he was allowed to exclude union organizers and
pickets on the grounds of trespass. Nahas v. Local 9o5, R.C.I.A., 144 Cal. App.2d 8o8,
301 P.zd 932 (1956). It would seem that the principle of Marshall Field & Co., 2oo
F.zd 3 (7th Cir. 2952), would produce a similar result under the federal act.
" NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948) Weyer-
heauser Timber Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 258 (-941).
"' Merchant's Motor Freight, Inc., 57 N.L.R.B. 1340 0 944).
"NLRB v. Kentucky Utilities Co., i91 F.2d 858 (6th Cir. i95i).6 6NLRB v. Cities Service Oil Co., i2 F.ad 149 (2d Cir. 1941).
8 Staub v. City of Baxley, 335 U.S. 313 (195S) ; Marsh v. Alabama, 3z6 U.S. 5oi
(1946) i Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. S16 (i4S5).
" "Concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid and protection" which are
protected by § 7, Labor Management Relations Act, are not limited to union activities.
NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 167 F.zd 983 (7 th Cir. 1948), where em-
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outsider's qualifications as a representative of their collective interests, 9
and would be guilty of an unfair labor practice if he undertook to deny
the organizer access to company property or otherwise attempted to
foreclose normal organizer-employee contact. The organizer's pro-
tection is not quite so complete, however, and one employer faced with
this dilemma was found not guilty of an unfair labor practice for dis-
criminating against a communist-infiltrated union in allowing use of his
premises for union activity. 70  It is, of course, dear that an employer
with knowledge or belief in the fraudulent purposes of an organizer
could divulge that fact to his employees without fear of violating the
Act71 and could invoke, for the protection of his employees, state and
federal criminal laws.72
CONCLUSION
The 1947 amendments to the Labor Management Relations Act
signaled a shift in federal policy from that of encouragement of labor
unions to that of assurance to workers of the freedom of choice on the
issue of unionization. In the past decade, judicial and administrative
cases have reflected this transfer of emphasis. Although the decisions
still are phrased in terms of balancing and adjusting the competing
interests of the employer and the union, the polar star has been protection
of employee freedom of choice, and the thread of these cases seems
to indicate a perceptible dilution of the non-employee union organizer's
position with the concomitant reinforcement of the employer's incidents
of ownership, especially with regard to the use of company property and
time.
ployees acted collectively under the protection of the Act for the purpose of securing
the removal of an incompetent record keeper.
G In Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (194.s), a Florida law requiring registration
of union business agents and vesting ultimate discretion for the issuance of licenses in a
board of high state officials was held to be in basic conflict with § 7 of the Act, which
guarantees employees full freedom of choice in designation of a bargaining representa-
tive, by substituting the judgment of the state officials for the judgment of the employees.
0 Stewart-Warner Corp. v. NLRB, 194 F.2d 207 (4 th Cir. x952).
"' Such exposure would be protected under the § 8 (c) privilege of expressing views
that do not contain threats of force or reprisal or promises of benefit. El Paso-Ysletta
Bus Line, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1149 (1949)5 E.A. Laboratories, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B.
673 (1950).
"E.g., the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act, xS U.S.C. § 420(a) (5952), and com-
parable state statutes. Many forms of objectionable union activities would violate
state ind federal anti-trust and restraint of trade laws. See Note, 37 COLUM. L. REv.
992, 999 (937).
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